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Supplemental Groundwater Irrigation
Law: From Capture to Sharing
By A. DAN TARLOCK*
INTRODUCTION

The Middle West and South East are the nation's farmbelt
because these areas are blessed with good soil and abundant
water resources. In contrast to the Great Plains and the Far
West, crops have historically been grown in these regions without
irrigation. Farmbelt agriculture has not competed either with the
major consumptive uses of water-domestic use, municipal supply and industrial use-or with the major non-consumptive uses
of water-navigation and recreation. However, regional agricultural nondependence on irrigation is now changing. Crop irrigation, for example, is rapidly increasing in the East and South
Atlantic Gulf regions.' In humid regions, supplemental irrigation
allows farmers not only to preserve existing crops but also to
improve crop yields, to plant two crops per growing season and
to switch to more valuable crops. The summers of 1982, 1983
and 1984 were unusually dry, and supplemental irrigation was
used extensively during these years, but the trend toward sup-

*A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965, Stanford University, Professor of Law, Chicago Kent College
of Law in the Illinois Institute of Technology. Raymond F. Rice Distinguished Visiting
Professor of Law, University of Kansas, Fall, 1985. Professor Tarlock consulted in the
preparation of plaintiff's trial and appellate briefs in Prohosky v. PrudentialInsurance
Co. discussed at notes 111-19.
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RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STATE AND

To THE YEAR 2000, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 244 (1984)
(report prepared for the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works).
NATIONAL WATER USE TRENDS
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plemental irrigation has been growing for the previous fifteen
2
years .
Supplemental irrigation in the Middle West and South East
may be accelerated by trends in both regional and national
agriculture. Agriculture is a business which must respond to
technological advances in production techniques. Agriculture is
becoming more capital intensive as machinery, fertilizers and
chemicals are substituted for labor. Crop yields must increase to
finance the new technologies, especially given the scale on which
they are applied. An adequate water supply must be readily
available to ensure that these higher crop yields can be achieved.
Moreover, long term increases in the value of agricultural land
further accelerate the adoption of irrigation systems.
Farmers in the Middle West and South East have additional
incentives to invest in supplemental irrigation. Irrigated agriculture has historically been centered in the Far West, but increased
pumping costs, caused by energy price increases and declining
supplies from mined aquifers, portend a shift from field crops
grown with groundwater to crops that can be grown on dryland
or irrigated with surface supplies. In many parts of the Far
West, surface supplies are unavailable or are fully allocated
under the law of prior appropriation so that it will be very costly
to acquire new agricultural water rights. Thus, some land may
have to be retired from irrigation. The Middle West and South
East will be the big regional winners from a shift in crop production patterns. One recent study predicts:
The Upper Mississippi, Lower Mississippi, and South AtlanticGulf basins will receive large increases in resource value....
Income [will shift] from the groundwater reliant irrigated ba-

2

In Indiana, for example, irrigated acreage increased by almost 65% from 1967

to 1976. See COOPERATIVE EXTENSION
CROPS IN INDIANA:

A

SERVICE, PURDUE UNIVERSITY, IRRIGATION OF FIELD

GUIDE FOR EVALUATING IRRIGATION POTENTIAL ON YOUR

FARM 2

(1976).
In many states, such as Kentucky, the extent of groundwater withdrawals is not
known. There are no specific Kentucky reports on the use of groundwater for supplemental irrigation. One study, however, states that approximately 0.2 million gallons per
day (mgd) are pumped from Kentucky groundwater sources and 4.7 mgd from surface
water sources for irrigation purposes. UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER
SUPPLY PAPER 2250, NATIONAL WATER SUMMARY 1983 - HYDROLOGICAL EVENTS AND
ISsUES 133. For a discussion of the situation in Arkansas see Looney, Modification of
Arkansas Water Law: Issues and Alternatives, 38 ARK. L. REV. 221, 222 (1984).
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sins to some surface reliant irrigated basins, but mostly to the

dryland regions which become [better] able to compete for
resources as water prices rise.3

Groundwater will be used more than surface water for supplemental irrigation because the technology is in place, because
supplies are more widely available and dependable during spot
droughts and because there are fewer legal constraints on
groundwater as compared to surface withdrawals.
This Article examines the law of groundwater allocation in
the Middle West and South East and proposes some modest
reforms to resolve the inevitable conflicts that will arise between
supplemental irrigators and other users. The existing law pri-

marily follows the common law, which characterizes groundwater as an incident of land ownership rather than as a common
pool resource to be shared among similarly situated users. 4 The

Restatement (Second) of Torts [hereinafter Restatement Second]
and a few courts have made initial efforts to adopt true sharing

rules, 5 but the impact of these new decisions on conflicts between

farmers and supplemental irrigators, or among supplemental
irrigators, is not clear. 6 A few states have supplemented the
common law with regulatory institutions, but these new allocaChristensen, Morton & Heady, Changing Energy Prices and IrrigationPatterns
in U.S. Agriculture, 2 Sw. Rav. 85, 96-99 (1982). A recent summary of a major study
of the future of American agriculture notes:
Much of the recent growth in irrigated acreage has been concentrated
in four states: Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas. Here irrigation is
used mainly to grow sorghum, corn and alfalfa. These crops are commonly
raised to feed cattle, and many of the nation's largest feedlots are in the
same states. The beef production has been made possible by the "mining"
of the Ogallala aquifer, a vast underground lake that spans eight states....
Recharge to the aquifer is exceedingly slow, with the result that the water
table has been steadily falling and pumping has become more costly.
Eventually the combination of a falling water table and rising energy
costs will probably make ground-water irrigation less popular. Farmers are
adjusting to higher water costs by adopting water-conservation measures; still,
the difference in profitability between irrigated farming and dryland farming has narrowed. If dryland farming returns to these areas, concentrated cattle
feeding will no longer have a competitive advantage in the states overlying
the Ogallala aquifer.
Batie & Healy, The Future of American Agriculture, 248 Sci. AM. 45, 47 (Feb.
1983). See generally M. BITTINGER & E. GREEN, You NEvER Miss THE WATER TILL....
(TE OGALLALA STORY) (1980).
See notes 23-41 infra and accompanying text.
See notes 42-65 infra and accompanying text.
6 See notes 66-120 infra and accompanying text.
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tion mechanisms are generally limited to emergency situations
and rarely have been used to allocate scarce supplies. 7 The thesis
of this Article is that the increased use of supplemental irrigation
will require the Middle Western and South Eastern states to

modify the common law rules of groundwater rights to incorporate
more equitable sharing rules.
Administrative allocation schemes are a secondary priority
in the Middle West and South East. Substantial legislative inter-

vention in groundwater allocation disputes is unlikely in the
foreseeable future because there is no need for the humid states
to implement conservation regulatory regimes on the scale of

programs in Arizona, Colorado or New Mexico.8 The courts
continue to be an adequate institution to resolve conflicts between supplemental irrigators and other users. The issue is what
rights the respective parties have, and there is sufficient prece-

dent to guide the courts. However, should farm consolidation
trends accelerate conflicts among supplemental irrigators beyond
the capacity of judicial resolution, local district regulation would
be the most desirable alternative. Agriculture has a long and
rich history of addressing problems through the use of local
districts formed by self-interested parties. 9
This Article first proposes a general policy framework for
the recognition of groundwater property rights.' 0 Three possible

approaches to groundwater allocation are then surveyed: (1) the
common law, (2) the Restatement (Second) of Torts and extenSee notes 121-44 infra and accompanying text.
I See generally Smith, Centralized Decisionmaking in the Administration of
Groundwater Rights: The Experience of Arizona, California and New Mexico and
Suggestions Forthe Future, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 641 (1984).
9 A prime example is the Soil Conservation Service, an organization which provides for co-operations between local farmers and the federal government in soil con7

servation matters. See SoI.

CONSERVATION POLICIES, INSTITUTIONS, AND INCENTIVES

7-8

(H. Halcrow, E. Heady & M. Cotner ed. 1982).
10The issues surrounding competing use of scarce common property resources are
to be distinguished from those issues surrounding alleged intertemporal misallocations
of nonrenewable natural resources, such as coal and oil. In the former situation, the
concern is primarily upon the failure of users of the common property resource to
account for the effect their use has on the ability of competing users to enjoy their use
of the resource. While this situation will often result in "over-use" of the resource, see

R.

BOADWAY, PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS

104-11 (1979), there may be no intertemporal

misallocation of resources if the resource is renewable. This Article is concerned with
the former issue.
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sions thereof, and (3) legislative modifications of the common
law.
I.

PROPERTY RIGHTS ASSIGNMENT CRITERIA

The creation of a market for a resource generally results in
the efficient allocation of that resource." Groundwater has a
number of potential uses and it is socially desirable to allow
markets, rather than a centralized authority, to generate the
allocation choices. In order for a market to operate efficiently
and fairly, the assignment of property rights in the resource
must meet three conditions: (1) maximum exclusivity, (2) enforceability and (3) transferability. 2 Otherwise, there will be
insufficient incentives for individuals to try to maximize the
3
value of the resource.'
With respect to groundwater, the first condition, maximum
exclusivity, is the most difficult to achieve. It is difficult to
assign exclusive rights to a resource when, for physical reasons,
one claimant's consumption inevitably interferes with another's
legitimate consumption. A groundwater basin is not like a coal
reserve which can be divided among different landowners; groundwater must be shared at all times by a large number of users. One
pumper's use affects both the quantity and pressure rate available
to other pumpers. In short, the assignment of groundwater pumping rights poses a knotty problem of adjusting responsibilities for
reciprocal externalities.' 4 Groundwater rights therefore have two

" See Anderson, Burt & Fractor, Privatizing Groundwater Basins: A Model and

Its Application, in WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE ALLOCATION, BUREAUCRACY AND THE ENVIRONMFNT 135-36 (T. Anderson ed. 1983).
,2 Id. at 223, 227.
Id.
An externality is said to exist if an activity of one party (a household or
firm) affects the utility or production possibilities of another party without
being priced. The fact that it is not priced implies that the "emitting" party
has no incentive to take into consideration the effect, beneficial or detrimental,
on the "affected" party. That being the case, the emitting party may devote
an inefficient amount of resources to pursuing the activity.
R. BOADWAY, PUBLIC SECTOR ECONOMICS 91 (1979).
"Reciprocal externalities exist when each party both emits and receives an externality from the other party. The most celebrated sort of [reciprocal externality] is the
so-called internal-to-the-industry externality arising in the unpriced use of common
property resources... ." Id. See also id. at 104-11. See generally Friedman, The Economics
of the Common Pool: ProperlyRights in Exhaustible Resources, 18 UCLA L. REv. 855
(1970-71).
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components: a claim to a fixed quantity and a claim to a fixed
pressure level. The quantity interrelationship issue can be solved
by rules that fix a definite quantity for each pumper, as was done
in California through the doctrine of mutual prescription,' 5 or as
was done in Oklahoma by statute." The pressure level issue is
harder to solve because each pumper's use causes reciprocal externalities. A truly efficient solution would charge each pumper for
his share of the reciprocal externalities, but the information costs
of implementing such a solution exceed the benefits of a completely

rational solution. 17
Legally, the most difficult allocation issue is deciding how
to assign common property rights between prior and subsequent
claimants.' 8 There is a strong, but not completely compelling,
case for assigning groundwater rights to the first pumpers in a
basin. 9 Our whole system of property rights is based on pro20
tecting the expectations generated by prior possession. Most
claimants would consider it unjust if prior possession was not
protected against subsequent possession. Also, it is often efficient to assign property rights to prior users rather than subsequent users. The subsequent user who values a resource more
than the prior user, can purchase the right to use the resource.
Finally, the subsequent user is often in a position to avoid the
social costs of the initiation of a new use. However, this analysis
does not apply to common property resources with the same

11See City of Pasedena v. City of Alhambra, 207 P.2d 17, 32 (Cal. 1949), cert.
denied, 339 U.S. 937 (1950). The California Supreme Court subsequently held that
mutual prescription does not apply against or between municipalities. City of Los Angeles
v. City of San Fernando, 537 P.2d 1250, 1301-02 (Cal. 1975) (construing CAL. Csvu.
CODE § 1007 (West 1982)).
,6 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, § 1020.9 (Vest Supp. 1984-85).
17 See Friedman, supra note 14, at 866-68.
11This analysis owes much to Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and its
UtilitarianConstraints, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 82-87 (1979). Professor Epstein argues for
a corrective justice theory of nuisance law that compensates those who suffer invasions
of previously assigned rights. The assignment of rights, however, must be based on the
expectations of the parties to exclusive enjoyment of a claim. In situations where
community activities make all members at once a tortfeasor and a victim, where the
injuries are reciprocal, it is not fair to compensate those who suffer injury. Instead, a
"live and let live" rule is fair. See also Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA.
L. REv. 1221 (1978-79) [hereinafter cited as Root of Title].
'" See Root of Title, supra note 18, at 1236-38.
20 See id. at 1238-43.
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force as it does to exclusive resources. Because of the physical
nature of common property, a prior user's expectations that the
status quo will always prevail are less legitimate than the expectations of prior possessors of exclusive resources. A groundwater
user must anticipate that pressure rates will drop as more users
enter a basin and that the costs of extraction will correspondingly
increase. A possessor of an exclusive resource, such as coal, need
not anticipate any claims, short of theft, that the resource be
2
shared with others. '
Because of the diminished expectations that arise in connection with shared resources, courts have been reluctant to protect
all incidents of prior possession. Courts have not been convinced
that the expectation of full preservation of the status quo is
legitimate. Beyond the intuitive adoption of the argument that
it is more efficient to allow new users into a basin with lower
overall pumping levels than to close a basin in order to freeze
existing pumping levels, courts have not progressed very far in
defining the pressure level component of a groundwater right.
In the Far West, legislatures have kicked the problem to administrative agencies, and many conservation regimes-such as mining restrictions, well spacing requirements and the coordination
of ground and surface rights-have the effect of pressure level
maintenance. 22 For the South East and Middle West, the pressure
level maintenance problem is largely unresolved.
II.

GROUNDWATER: THE COMMON LAW

Eastern states have historically followed the English common
law of groundwater use which is a pure rule of capture. 23 The
right to use groundwater is incident to land ownership. This rule
was a product of the nineteenth century attitude that individual

21 This analysis excludes any sharing claims made by the holder of the surface
estate against the severed mineral interest for damages to the surface. See, e.g., Island
Creek Coal Co. v. Rodgers, 644 S.W.2d 339, 343-45 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
21 See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 45-102 (West Cum. Supp. 1984-85) which
provides for the establishment of the State Department of Water Resources. This
department has all ground and surface water management responsibilities. Id. at § 45103.
, NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, A SuMMARy DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS 49 (R.
Dewsnup & D. Jensen eds. 1973).
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discretion with respect to land use should not be fettered. 24
Under the "English rule" of groundwater use, developed in 1843
in Acton v. Blundell,25 a landowner is entitled to extract water
regardless of the consequences to surrounding landowners and
users. 26 The American courts which followed this rule analogized
groundwater to things ferae naturae and thus subject to capture. 27 As an additional basis for granting an unlimited right to
capture, some nineteenth century courts reasoned that it was
2
impossible or too costly to assign rights other than by self-help. 8
In the extreme, the English rule allowed unlimited pumping,
even for wasteful and malicious purposes. 29 American courts
soon rubbed the rough edges off the rule and enjoined malicious
and wasteful pumping. 0 In practice, courts tended to merge
these two concepts, defining pumping for a malicious purpose
as waste. 3' Beyond this limitation, there are no restrictions on
an overlying landowner's right to use water under the classic
32
English rule.
A rule of capture is appropriate when the costs of allocating
a common resource are high and competing users are making
similar uses of the resource. Capture is inefficient when the
opportunity costs of excessive present consumption are high.
The law of oil and gas use developed from a similar rule of
capture in the nineteenth century, but by the early twentieth
century the costs of excessive pumping had become manifest.
Courts were unable to impose significant limitations on the rate
of oil and gas extraction, and to curb excessive pumping, legis4 See, e.g., Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 534 (Pa. 1855) ("The general principle
undoubtedly is, that he who owns the soil has it even to the sky, and to the lowest
depths. He may dig as deep and build as high as he pleases.").
152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Exch. Ch. 1843). Acton was reaffirmed in Langbrook
Properties, Ltd. v. Surrey County Council, [1969] 3 All E.R. 1424, 1430.
3 All E.R. at 1428.
27 See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 204 (1900).
" See, e.g., Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528, 534 (Pa. 1855). See also Frazier v.
Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861) (any attempt to administer movements of water would
be "practically impossible"), overruled in Cline v. American Aggregates Corp., 115
Ohio St. 3d 384, 474 N.E.2d 324 (1984). For a brief explanation of aquifer mechanics,
see Friedman, supra note 14, at 884-85.
29 See Huber v. Merkel, 94 N.W. 354, 356 (Wis. 1903).
10See text accompanying notes 48-53 infra for a classic example.
3, See, e.g., Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel Co., 72 N.E. 849 (Ind. 1904).
For a full explanation of this case, see notes 48-53 infra and accompanying text.
32 See Smith, supra note 8, at 641 n.2.
16
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latures responded with conservation legislation that substituted
legislatively defined correlative rights for the common law right
of capture.3 3 The progressive conservation era in the early twentieth century established the principle-which is still vigorously
34
debated-that private property rights can be limited by the state
but groundwater law was initially less influenced by this era.
The English rule underwent one substantial but ultimately
limited modification in response to a technological and political
problem that arose in the early twentieth century. Cities began
to use high capacity wells sunk in well fields adjacent to farmland to extract large amounts of water for municipal supply.
Farmers sued cities for well losses, and out of these suits came
35
the American or reasonable use rule.
, Under the American rule, groundwater is classified as an
incident of land ownership, but three restraints are placed on
extraction. First, the use must be reasonable. 36 Second, the use
is restricted to overlying land. 37 Finally, all non-overlying use is
per se unreasonable, although courts have demonstrated an increasing willingness to allow transfers that do not in fact cause
injuries to overlying landowners. 38 The American rule, except as
applied between overlying and nonoverlying owners, is not a
rule of apportionment because there is no sharing among similarly situated users.3 9 Once these requirements are met, an overlying land owner can extract all the water he wants to the point
40
of dewatering a neighbor.
Because both the English and American rules are capture
rules, the common law of groundwater use does not, in theory,
encourage farmers to invest in supplemental irrigation. The insta-

I1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW §§ 204.3-.6 (1984).
The philosophical and historical antecedents of this concept are traced in Rose,
Mahon Reconstructed: Why The Takings Issue Is Still A Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561,
587-92 (1984).
11See, e.g., Forbell v. City of New York, 58 N.E. 644, 644-46 (N.Y. 1900) (court
upheld injunction preventing city from operating pumping station).
36 See Sainato v. Potter, 159 A.2d 632, 634 (Md. 1960). See also Kramer & Turner,
Prevention of Waste or Unreasonable Use of Water: The CaliforniaExperience, 197980 AaRIC. L.J. 519, 519-31.
17 A narrow definition of overlying use could hinder agricultural use in some
states. See Looney, supra note 2, at 245.
1 See, e.g., Lingo v. City of Jacksonville, 522 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Ark. 1975).
19 Cf. id. at 406.
- See, e.g., Finley v. Teeter Stone, Inc., 248 A.2d 106, 113 (Md. 1968).
"
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bility of the groundwater right could in fact deter investment
in supplemental irrigation systems. In practice, however, a capture rule may be a sufficient basis for an individual investment.
The first pumper can use all the water that he needs, provided
that he can afford to maintain his pumping rate against subsequent pumpers.
The real problem is that, from a social perspective, capture
rules are both inefficient and unfair. A rule of capture may be
unfair to prior, smaller pumpers who have limited means of
protecting their investments against subsequent, larger pumpers.
The constant displacement of pumping levels is socially undesirable because it tends to produce an inefficient allocation of
resources. A groundwater basin is a common property resource
where private property rights remain inadequately defined, and
a user has no incentive to compare future versus present values
of the resource. For this reason, unrestrained capture produces
an inefficient use of the resource:
In the absence of a centralized decision rule or well-defined,
enforced, and transferable property rights, externalities will
arise and net value of the basin will not be maximized. Standard economic theory tells us that when there are many producing firms in the basin acting independently, each one
pumping a small enough share of the total that it can economically ignore its own effect on groundwater stocks. The resulting decision rule under uncontrolled pumping would equate
net marginal value of water in current production to zero
instead of a positive value as would occur under optimal
management. Obviously, uncontrolled pumping with many firms
could be very wasteful of the groundwater resource. 4'
III.

THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS:
TOWARD A TRUE SHARING RULE

The distinguishing feature of both the English and American
or reasonable use rules, in contrast to the law of riparian rights
governing allocation of surface waters, is that neither rule follows true general sharing principles. The basic argument for

41

Anderson, Burt & Fractor, supra note 11, at 233. See also note 10 supra.
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groundwater law reform is that surface and groundwater rights
should be the same. California began the reform in 1903 by
42
applying the surface law of riparian rights to groundwater.
California's correlative rights rule gives all overlying owners in
43
a basin an equal right to an equitable share of the aquifer.
Among overlying owners, withdrawals cannot exceed the basin's
safe yield, and nonoverlying owners can acquire rights only if
there is a surplus over safe yield."4
The correlative rights rule was long thought to be confined
to California and Nebraska. 45 It was evidently assumed that the
early twentieth century common law in the eastern United States
had no sharing tradition, but such an assumption is erroneous.
A close examination of some conservation era cases reveals that,
although a sharing rule was not necessary to the disposition of
many decisions, the courts were receptive to the development of
sharing rules. 4 This subtle strain in the common law of groundwater use has become important because the Restatement (Second) of Torts [Second Restatement] cautiously reaches back to
this tradition in its effort to modify the common law.
Receptivity to the development of sharing rules can be found
in early Indiana and New York 47 cases. Illustrative of this development is Gagnon v. French Lick Springs Hotel.48 Gagnon
arose when the French Lick Springs Company sold a historic
spa and springs to the French Lick Hotel Company and, in the
process, froze out some of the shareholders of the French Lick
Springs Company. 49 These shareholders joined with the Baden
Lick Sulfur Springs Company, a rival hotel located up the valley
from the French Lick Hotel, to destroy the source of French
Lick's business. 0 Gagnon, who was Baden Lick's agent, and the
"

See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 70 P. 663 (Cal. 1902), modified on reh'g, 74 P. 766, 772

(Cal. 1903).
1' See Smith, supra note 8, at 662-75 for an explanatio
rights rule.

of California's correlative

" See id.
See Olson v. City of Wahoo, 248 N.W. 304, 307-08 (Neb. 1933). See also Jones
v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 306 S.W.2d 111, 115 (Ark. 1957) (correlative rights rule
adopted in dictum).
" See notes 48, 77 infra.
" See notes 54-55 infra and accompanying text.
41 72 N.E. 849 (Ind. 1904).
4 Id. at 850.
Id.
"4
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frozen out shareholders drilled a number of wells for the sole
purpose of pumping French Lick dry."' "Following the lead of
the later decisions [dealing with groundwater rights], which we
think proceed upon just and correct principles" the court af52
firmed a temporary injunction against such pumping.
There are narrow explanations for the case. Gagnon could
be explained as a case where springs were fed by a subterranean
stream with defined banks, thus invoking the surface rules of
riparian rights.5 3 Gagnon is also classic example of malicious
pumping, and the court may have done no more than to place
a sensible limitation on the English rule. However-in linking
the leading case, Forbell v. City of New York, 54 with the California correlative rights rule, which is a true sharing rule-the
court's opinion shows great sensitivity to the underlying reaons
for the adoption of the American rule:
[T]he courts of New York have held that the drainage of land
of a private owner by a city pumping works, which exhausts
from all the ground in its vicinity the natural supply of underground or subterranean water, and thus prevents the raising
on it of crops to which it was or would be peculiarly adapted,
or destroys such crops after they are grown or partly grown,
renders the city liable to the landowner for the damages he
sustains, and entitles him to an injunction against the continuance of the wrong. Forbell v. New York ....
A further
exception to the rules laid down in Acton v. Blundell ... was
made in the recent case of Katz, Ex'r, v. Walkingshaw ...
where it was declared that the owner of a portion of a tract
of land which is saturated below the surface with an abundant
supply of percolating water cannot remove water from wells
thereon for sale, if the remainder of the tract is thereby deprived of water necessary for its profitable enjoyment....
The strong trend of the later decisions is toward a qualification
of the earlier doctrine that the landowner could exercise unlimited and irresponsible control over subterranean waters on his
own land, without regard to the injuries which might thereby
result to the lands of other proprietors in the neighborhood.
,I Id. at 851.
5

Id. at 852.
The opinion does not clearly describe the underground spring. See id. at 850-

51.

58 N.E. 644 (N.Y. 1900).
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Local conditions, the purpose for which the landowner excavates or drills holes or wells on his land, the use or nonuse
intended to be made of the water, and other like circumstances
have come to be regarded as more or less influential in this
class of cases, and have justly led to an extension of the
maxim, "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedaes," to the rights
of landowners over subterranean waters, and to some abridgment of their supposed power to injure their neighbors without
55
benefiting themselves.
These early cases that recognize or at least are hospitable to
true sharing rules influenced the drafters of the Second Restatement to announce new limitations on the common law rule of
capture. Because water rights have traditionally been governed
by tort, rather than property law, water use conflicts have been
seen as liability, rather than property rights, questions.5 6 Despite
the convergence of these two classifications, this is a distinction
with a difference. Liability rules are imposed after the fact and
often on an ad hoc basis. The need for certainty in tort law to
deter conduct has always been recognized 57 but the need to
compensate those injured by an activity has led courts to tolerate
a much greater decree of uncertainty in the formulation of
liability rules, as compared to property rules which are designed
to induce reliance. For example, the Restatement of Torts [First
Restatement] analogizes water use conflicts to nuisance cases and
applies the same open-ended balancing test to both.18 The First
Restatement's balancing test, however, is inappropriate because
it undercompensates5 9 and asks extraneous questions. The balancing test is doubly wrong when applied to groundwater disputes because it prevents the definition of clear property rights.
So many factors are relevant to the balancing that it is impossible
to tell in advance of a conflict whether a property right will be
recognized. 6° Obviously, no user has any incentive to tailor his
conduct so as to avoid infringing on another's property right

" 72 N.E. at 852.
. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 41, introductory
17 Cf. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 16 (4th ed.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 850A, 822 (1939).
See also note 18 supra.
See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 850A (1939).

See
"

note, p. 181-83.
1971).
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when no one can predict who has such a right. The net result is
that balancing is both inefficient and unfair.
The drafters of the Second Restatement sought to mitigate
the deficiencies of the First Restatement's approach by incorporating some stability into the sacred balancing test. Balancing
was kept in form, but the drafters managed to incorporate prior
appropriation principles into the common law by making "the
protection of existing values of water uses, land investments and
enterprises" a factor in the balancing. 6 ' The addition of this
factor is thought by many to be declarative of what common
law courts in fact did 62 and is a major advancement over the
formulation of the abstract common law rules of water allocation.
The groundwater section of the Second Restatement incorporated the protection of prior users into the balancing for the
express purpose of protecting small, as against large, users.
Section 858 provides:
(1) A proprietor of land or his grantee who withdraws
groundwater from the land and uses it for a beneficial purpose
is not subject to liability for interference with the use of water
by another, unless
(a) the withdrawal of groundwater unresonably causes
harm to a proprietor of neighboring land through lowering
the water table or reducing artesian pressure,
(b) the withdrawal of groundwater exceeds the proprietor's reasonable share of the annual supply or total
store of groundwater, or
(c) the withdrawal of the groundwater has a direct
and substantial effect upon a watercourse or lake and
unreasonably causes harm to a person entitled to the use
of its water.
(2) The determination of liability under clauses (a), (b) and
(c) of Subsection (1) is governed by the principles stated in §§
850 to 857.63
6,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 850A(h) (1979).

61 See, e.g., Beuscher, Appropriation Water Law Elements in Riparian Doctrine
States, 10 BUFFALO L. REv. 448 (1961).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (1979).
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Restatement envisions a rule of capture among large pumpers
who enter the basin at the same time, but contemplates a rule
of prior appropriation between preexisting smaller and subsequent larger pumpers.64
Section 858's principal change is to extend the protection
which overlying owners have long enjoyed from large nonoverlying uses to include protection from large overlying uses as Well.
The comments make it clear that the determinative factor is
whether the plaintiff's expectations of longstanding pumping
conditions have been upset:
The withdrawal of a large quantity of water from an
artesian formation by natural forces or pumping will reduce
the artesian pressure over a similar area. If the land overlying
the affected area is held in different ownerships, one person's
large deep well equipped with a powerful pump may lower the
water beyond the reach of the shallow well of his neighbor or
cause the artesian well of a neighbor to cease to flow. There
is usually water enough for all users, and the problem is one
of -who must bear the cost of deepening the prior well, drilling
a new deep well, installing a pump, paying increased pumping
costs or obtaining water from an alternate source.
In situations in which neighboring landowners use water for
domestic or irrigation purposes on overlying land, both of the
common law rules, absolute ownership and reasonable use...
cast on each water user the burden of improving his own facilities
or paying the additional costs when their joint activities lower
the water table or reduce artesian pressure. However, in most
cases in which a city or industry purchases ground water rights
or a small tract of land and installs deep wells and high capacity pumps it increases considerably the demand on the ground
water supply and the possibilities of harm to owners of neighboring land who use the common resource for domestic and
agricultural purposes. The reasonable use rule in its original form
met this problem by imposing liability for interference with
neighboring wells and springs by withdrawing large quantities of
water and piping it to distant places for municipal and industrial
use. As usually stated, the rule gave no protection against identical harm caused by a large industrial plant or apartment house
built on neighboring overlying land. Recently it has been

" See id. at comments a-h, illustrations 1-7.
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recognized however, that the salient factor is not the place of the
use but the withdrawal of water in unprecedented quantities for
purposes not common to the locality, and that it is fair and just
to place the cost of improving neighboring facilities upon the person or organization whose withdrawals render them inadequate,
even though the water is used on the land from which it is
withdrawn.
The rule of Clause (a) of this Subsection adopts this modern
view, and bases the protection against loss of access to the water
not on the single arbitrary factor of the place where the water
is used, but on a consideration of whether, under all circumstances, the harm done by lowering the water table or pressure
is unreasonable." 5
IV.

ADOPTION OF THE SECOND

RESTATEMENT AND

BEYOND

Section 858 has been applied by the courts of Michigan, Ohio
and Wisconsin and has been cited with approval by courts in Nebraska and New Jersey. Indiana alone has rejected it. In all
cases where section 858 has been applied or has influenced a
decision, a prior user had his supply drained by a subsequent
pumper, and the court has applied section 858 to protect the
prior against the subsequent user.
Wisconsin was the first state to apply secton 858, and that
state's adoption of the section was significant in light of the
state's long adherence to the English rule. 66 In State v. Michels
Pipeline Construction Co.67 a sewage district contractor dewatered the soil around a sixty-inch diameter sewer line that he
was constructing, and as a result, certain landowners suffered
subsidence and decreased well capacity.6 8 Michels reversed the
leading Wisconsin case which had applied the full English rule,
and adopted section 858 because "[w]ater users with superior
economic resources should not be allowed to impose costs on
' 69
smaller water users that are beyond their economic capacity.

65

66
67

Id. at comment e.
See Huber v. Merkel, 94 N.W. 354, 356 (Wis. 1903).
217 N.W.2d 339 (Wis. 1974).

68 Id. at 340.
69

Id. at 351 (overruling 94 N.W. 354).
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Michigan has also applied section 858 in a case where the
extractor would win at common law. In Maerz v. United States
Steel Corp.,70 a quarry dewatering operation caused nearby domestic wells to fail. 7' The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed
a partial summary judgment for the quarry owner, stating that
section 858 is "more fair and just than the English rule or lesser
modifications of the English rule, and should be followed in
Michigan.' '72
73
The Nebraska Supreme Court, in Prather v. Eisenmann,
held that a large center pivot irrigator who causes significant
pressure level declines to domestic wells must pay the costs of
75
deepening the wells. 74 The trial court had applied section 858,
but the supreme court chose to affirm the decision because of a
76
statutory preference for domestic, as against agricultural, uses.
Prathercreates a rule of competition within, not between, classes
of users:
It is our statute which distinguishes the Nebraska rule from
other rules. Under the statute, the use of underground water
for domestic purposes has first preference. It takes priority
over all other uses. As between domestic users, however, there
is no preference or priority. Every overlying owner has an
equal right to a fair share of the underground water for
domestic purposes. If the artesian head in the present situation
had been lowered by other domestic users, plaintiffs would be
entitled to no relief so long as they still could obtain water by
deepening their wells. If the water became insufficient for the
use of all domestic users, each domestic user would be entitled
to a proportionate share of the water. All domestic users,
regardless of priority in time, are entitled to a fair share of
77
the water in the aquifer.

" 323 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 1982). On the last day of 1984, Ohio adopted § 858
and remanded for further proceedings a suit between 26 domestic well users and a
quarry. See also Cline v. American Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324 (Ohio 1984).
323 N.W.2d at 526.
72 323 N.W.2d at 530.
261 N.W.2d 766 (Neb. 1978).
" Id.
at 768.
Id. at 770.
76 See id. at 771 (applying NEB. RaV. STAT. § 46-613 (1978) which provides that
domestic use be given preference in the use of underground water).
" Id. at 766.
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All states have a preference for domestic as against other uses
so the Pratherresult could obtain in any state, 78 but at least one
trial judge has not applied the statutory preference in a situation
similar to that presented in Prather. In Woodsum v. Township
of Pemberton,79 a New Jersey trial court held that a small
domestic well owner who suffered a well decline when a municipal well field was put in nearby could not recover any damages
for pressure declines. s0 The plaintiffs abandoned their property
after the water loss and claimed damages for the difference
between the value of the land before and after the dewatering.8s
The well could have been deepened at a cost of $750.00 to
$1,700.00, but plaintiffs claimed that they had no funds for this
purpose.12 On appeal, the superior court judge noted that the
3
Second Restatement rule was close to the correlative rights rule,
and concluded that in an old leading decision, Meeker v. City
of East Orange,8 4 New Jersey had adopted the correlative rights
rule.85 Since the city in Woodsum was making a nonoverlying
use, the plaintiffs could have probably prevailed under either
the American or the correlative rights rules. 6 However, the trial
judge faced squarely an issue that most courts have avoided:
whether a right to a fixed pressure level is part of a groundwater
right? The Woodsum court relied on the reasonable pumping
level rules formulated in the Far West 87 in addressing this issue:
The landowner who provides for his domestic supply of
water through a shallow well, possibly because of a high subterranean water table, and who constructs that well at a time
when no other users affect his water supply, does so with the
knowledge that other users may appear who may lower the

E.g., Evans v. Merriweather, 4 III. (3 Scam.) 492 (1842).
71412 A.2d 1064 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980), aff'd, 427 A.2d 615 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981).
See id. at 1076.
Id. at 1067.
82 Id.
8 Id. at 1072.
74 A. 379 (N.J. 1909).
The court adopted this interpretation of Meeker from Hanks & Hanks, The
Law of Water in New Jersey: Ground Water, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 621, 650-61 (196970). See 412 A.2d at 1072.
See 412 A.2d at 1070-72.
See id. at 1074 (citing Wayman v. Murray City Corp., 458 P.2d 861, 864-66
(Utah 1969)).
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water table and diminish or eliminate his water supply. He is
bound to share his water with such other users on a reasonable
basis. Therefore, if his use is to be described as "reasonable,"
he must dig his well to a depth which anticipates the lowering
of the water table by virtue of other "proper users". A subsequent purchaser of the property on which the well is located
must take title subject to these continuing requirements. It
would make no sense at all to permit a conveyance to defeat
the rights of the third parties. 8
Woodsum was subsequently affirmed on different grounds.
Since the plaintiffs had recovered more than the maximum possible damages-the costs of deepening the well-in a settlement
from one defendant, all taking issues were adjudged moot at the
89
time of the trial court's decision.
The trial judge's analysis, influenced by section 858, illustrates both the strengths and weaknesses of the balancing approach. First, any definition of groundwater rights must include
both pressure and quantity components. However, the judge
addressed the pressure component through the use of a faiacious
balancing test. He asked whether the public need for the water
was greater than the plaintiff's need. Not surprisingly, the judge
decided that the public need for the water outweighed the plaintiff's right to an historic pressure level: "It is now even more
necessary that private users of subterranean water acknowledge
the public interest in that water source, an interest to which the
Legislature has given increasing recognition. A reasonable use
of such water is one which accommodates that public need." 9
This is an incomplete efficiency analysis because it assumes that
rights should be assigned to persons who most likely would have
purchased the resource in the open market. Clearly, if put to a
choice, the township would have purchased plaintiff's water right
to operate the well field, but this is not the end of the inquiry.
Efficiency is a compelling rationale for the assignment of
property rights. However, allowing courts to assign rights, as
the Second Restatement does, by choosing the higher over the
lower valued use presents too many risks of arbitrary public

"

Id. at 1076.

Woodsum v. Township of Pemberton, 427 A.2d 615, 618 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1981).
9oSee 412 A.2d at 1076.
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action. Any welfare gain should be net of losses suffered to

private individuals. To ensure the social gains of public actions
are in fact net of individual losses, the law has sensibly insisted
that compensation is due when property is taken. 91 The trial
judge in Woodsum correctly understood that he had to decide
whether the plaintiff did have a recognized property right. But,
instead of adopting a Restatement-based balancing test, 92 he
should have asked the traditional question which is more consonant with the compensation rationale: whether plaintiff's water
use, including the pressure level, was customary in the community. At a minimum, any sharing rule should compensate a well
owner who has drilled a well to a depth commonly found in the
community and who suffers losses from subsequently drilled
high-capacity wells. 93 Small, shallow wells present problems, because a court can reasonably conclude that such a well is substandard and thus has no protected preexisting pressure level.
Well drilling codes could be a basis for distinguishing standard
from substandard wells, but such codes ought not to be applied
retroactively to deny compensation to average, yet substandard,
wells.
Only one state, Indiana, has considered section 858 and
rejected it. In Wiggins v. Brazil Coal & Clay Corp.,94 a strip
miner drained an artificial recreational lake, around which a

9' Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9 See notes 58-66 supra and accompanying text.
91 One commentator has suggested:
[E]astern groundwater allocation rules should be modified to reflect the
current state of knowledge and the expense of hydrologic testing. There
should be two rules, one applying to high-capacity wells and the other
applying to small wells. High capacity wells should be defined as those
wells that a reasonable man would not install without first making hydrologic tests to determine the availability of adequate groundwater supplies, or obtaining information previously developed by others yielding
substantially the same results as new tests. With respect to such wells, the
landowner should be charged with the knowledge the tests revealed about
groundwater movement and effects on neighboring users of groundwater
and stream water or, if the tests are not made, what they would have
revealed. He should be held liable for any unreasonable injurious consequences which could have been predicted from the test results under the
correlative rights rule of groundwater or some similar rule requiring a
comparison of the reasonableness of conflicting uses.
Davis, Wells and Streams: Relationship At Law, 37 Mo. L. REv. 189, 236 (1972).
440 N.E.2d 495 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982), vacated, 452 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. 1983).
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small subdivision had been developed.95 The trial court had ruled
that the coal company was not liable because Indiana law prohibited only the intentional and malicious waste of groundwater, 96 but an intermediate appeals court reversed.: The Surface
Mine Control and Reclamation Act's hydrologic balance requirements, which protect water tables from dimunition because of
surface mining, 98 were construed to require that state law protect
water users from the adverse effects of strip mining.9 9 Section
858 was identified as a proper avenue through which to protect
the plaintiff's federally mandated rights. °° The theory that federal law requires the adoption of section 858 was probably
wrong, but the court's reading of the hydrologic balance requirement is at least consistent with another court's subsequent construction of United States Department of Interior regulations. 0 1
On a motion to transfer, the court of appeals' decision was
vacated and the trial judge's ruling was reinstated. 02
In Wiggins, section 858 was brushed aside with the conclusion that it was not applicable because it did not directly govern
the case.'0 3 To support its holding that the strip miner was not
liable, the court misread the Indiana decision in Gagnon v.
French Lick Springs Hotel Co. 104 Instead of recognizing, as have
other courts and scholars, that Gagnon departed from the Eng-

9 Id. at 496.
91 Id. at 497.
97

Id. at 496.

92

See 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(3) (1982). See generally Israel, Emerging Federaland

State Conflicts Affecting Western Coal Development, 26 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. FDN. 157

(1980).
9 440 N.E.2d at 498-500.
See id. at 500-01.
101 See In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation, 21 ENV'T RaP.

CAS.

(BNA) 1724 (D.D.C. 1984) (hydrologic balance requirement applies regardless of whether
farming occurs). Cf. Wiggins v. Brazil Coal & Clay Corp., 452 N.E.2d 958, 965 (Ind.
1983) (Hunter, J., dissenting).
I- See 452 N.E.2d 958, 959 (Ind. 1983). See also Irving Materials, Inc. v. Carmody,
436 N.E.2d 1163, 1164-65 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (applying Gagnon in holding that
reasonable land use is legal and permits no award for damages). Vermont reaffirmed
the absolute ownership rule in 1973. See Drinkwine v. State, 300 A.2d 616, 617-18 (Vt.
1973).
101See 452 N.E.2d at 963.
'o' See notes 48-53 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Gagnon.
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lish rule,105 the Indiana Supreme Court incorrectly read the case
as applying the "law governing property in water as that law
had been previously applied in Indiana." ' '° Prior cases had
adopted the English rule with no qualifications, and Gagnon not
only rejected the full force of the English rule but looked toward
a true sharing rule. To compound its error, the court analogized
the case to surface run-off conflicts and applied an Indiana
case' 0 7 which holds that a surface owner can repel water and
"throw such water back upon higher land, so long as it is not
passing through a natural channel or watercourse."'' 0 8
The analogy between the rules of surface drainage and those
governing groundwater rights is often urged in dewatering cases,
but it is a false comparison.' °9 There is more need for a sharing
rule for the allocation of groundwater among competing users
than for rules, such as the law of drainage and surface water
repulsion, which constrain the development of property. Because
a landowner has a well-defined package of property rights, he
can more easily protect himself from interference through a
combination of bargains with surrounding landowners and the
use of established common law tort rules restricting the improv101An

Indiana study concluded:
Even if the absolute ownership doctrine pertaining to groundwater
still applied in Indiana after [Gagnon], it is unlikely that the rationale for
applying it exists today. The reason given by the early courts for using the
absolute ownership doctrine was that the location and quantity of groundwater was unknown and unknowable. However, in the years since those
early cases were decided, the sciences of hydrology and geology have
evolved to the point that there is a greatly increased potential for predicting
the location, amount, and flow patterns of water below the earth's surface.
Therefore, in light of the more equitable doctrines that have evolved in
other areas of water law such as the reasonable use doctrine for riparian
owners it is unlikely that the absolute ownership doctrine would be strictly
applied today.
Tm GOVERNOR'S WATER RESOURCE STUDY COMMISSION, Tim INDIANA WATER RESOURCE:
AvArLABIrry, USES AND NEEDS 96 (1980).
1o 452 N.E.2d at 964. The two groundwater cases which preceded Gagnon were
New Albany & Salem R.R. v. Peterson, 14 Ind. 112 (1860) and City of Greencastle v.
Hazelett, 23 Ind. 186 (1864). These cases did apply the English, or absolute ownership,
rule, but Gagnon expressly refused to follow this rule to its logical end. See 72 N.E. at
851.
", Taylor, Adm'r v. Fickas, 64 Ind. 167 (1878).
1 452 N.E.2d at 963.
109See generally Hanks & Hanks, supra note 85, at 630-48. See also Friendswood
Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., 576 S.W.2d 21, 27-28, 30 (Tex. 1978) (even under
English rule, groundwater users prospectively liable for negligent pumping).
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er's right to change natural drainage patterns. Where property
rights are undefined, as they are with respect to Indiana groundwater, a claimant cannot protect himself against other users in
this manner, and if many pumpers exist, there will be very little
incentive to cooperate to restrain the rate of pumping." 0 There
is therefore a need to define the rights of competing users in a
way that promotes sharing.
A federal district court refused to follow Wiggins in Prohosky v. PrudentialInsurance Co.,' a conflict between a largescale supplemental irrigator and a number of small farmers and
domestic well owners. The insurance company in Prohosky purchased a 21,000 acre ranch in northern Indiana and leased large
tracts of land to farmers for the purpose of growing corn, with
the stipulation that the lessees install and use center pivot irrigation systems. During the summers of 1982, 1983 and 1984, a
number of small wells in areas around Prudential's land went
dry and some of the well owners who claimed to be affected by
the irrigation pumping sued in federal district court.
Wiggins suggested that either malicious or gratuitous pumping might be actionable.1 2 Malicious pumping is a well understood concept, but gratuitous pumping is not, and the federal
district court took seriously its Erie duties to look to both case
law and statutory sources to resolve doubtful questions of state
law. After an examination of the evolution of Indiana common
law and of state laws which restrict ground water uses in emergency situations, the court concluded:
When one looks at the totality of the common law and
the full sweep of the aforesaid enactments by the Indiana
General Assembly there is a clearly emerging legislative intent
in the State of Indiana to rub off the hard edges of the
common law in regard to the absolute right of an owner of
land to extract ground water from the area underlying that
land for any purpose in an unlimited amount. Given its factual
11o
A recent study

of cooperative operations of Texas and Oklahoma oil fields from

1926-1935 concludes that voluntary cooperation is most likely when there are only a few
large operators. See Libecap & Wiggins, ContractualResponses to the Common Pool,
74 Am. ECON. REv. 87, 92-97 (1984). See generally M. OLsoN, THE LoGic OF COLLECTVE
AcTION (1966).
M 584 F. Supp. 1337 (N.D. Ind. 1984).
M See 452 N.E.2d at 964.
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setting, Wiggins is only of limited value in deciding this case
and in fixing the relative rights of adjacent landowners with
regard to the extraction of ground water in massive amounts
from beneath closely located tracts of land."'
The court then construed "gratuitous pumping" expansively to
include the use of water for no valid or an extremely limited
social purpose. The relevant issues were defined as "(1) whether
the water is being used to further the enjoyment of the user's
land; (2) whether use of the water is proceeding in a usual and
proper manner; or, alternatively, (3) whether water is being
wasted."" 4 Applying these criteria, the court concluded that
some plaintiffs may have demonstrated a sufficient interconnection between Prudential's pumping and their water supply to
merit damages," 5 but the level of proof was insufficient for
injunctive relief." 6 The court did enjoin one wasteful pumping
practice, i.e., spraying water from endguns on the irrigation
system on the public highways,"17 and appointed a monitor to
evaluate plaintiffs' complaints about lost water." 8 Jurisdiction
was retained to decide if plaintiffs were entitled to damages.'1 9
The Seventh Circuit held that the injunction against endgun
spraying was an abuse of the trial court's discretion under Indiana law because plaintiffs failed to introduce sufficient evidence to show a causal connection between the spraying and any
resulting injury to individual water users. The case was remanded
for trial on the damage issue, and the court of appeals did not
discuss the trial judge's analysis of "gratuitous" pumping so, at
least in the Seventh Circuit, there may be real limitations on
20
large-scale groundwater use in Indiana.'
All groundwater conflicts present difficult cause-in-fact issues
given the inexactitude of the science of geohydrology. But once
an interconnection between pumping and subsequent drawdown
is established, a plaintiff should not be per se barred from
recovery by capture rules.
,,3 584 F. Supp. at 1344.
" Id. at 1343. See generally Kramer & Turner, supra note 36.
" See 584 F. Supp. at 1343.
116 Id.
at 1350-52.
"I See id. at 1351.
"1 See id. at 1352.
119Id.

,20 Prohosky v. Prudential Insurance Co., 767 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1985).
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VI.

LEGISLATIVE MODIFICATION OF THE COMMON LAW

Some nonappropriation states have recently moved to the
administrative regulation of groundwater use, but the regulatory
schemes have just begun to address the problem of supplemental
irrigation. The situation in Kentucky illustrates the ineffectiveness of permit systems. Groundwater withdrawals are covered in
the state's 1966 permit system, but all domestic and agricultural
withdrawals are exempt from the permit requirement.' 2' A few
states such as Iowa have comprehensive permit programs,' 22 but
the impact on groundwater withdrawals has been minimal. Indiana,'1 New Jersey,' 24 Georgia' 25 and Virginia' 26 have statutes
that allow the state to limit high capacity wells on an emergency
basis in times of drought, but these statutes permit only ad hoc
responses to specific problems. In response to the problem that
caused the litigation in Prohosky, Indiana passed legislation in
1982 which applied only to the two counties affected by the corn
irrigation supplemental withdrawals.' 27 The Director of Natural
Resources is authorized to shut down or limit high capacity wells
that substantially lower the water table and cause domestic and
livestock use wells, which comply with state law, to fail to deliver
their normal supply.' 28 In the summer of 1984, the Director of
the Department of Natural Resources shut down four of Prudential's wells "until such time as the Department determines
that groundwater levels have sufficiently recovered to protect
neighboring and livestock and domestic wells."' 2 9 In 1985, Indiana
adopted a statewide system that allows the Director of Natural
Resources to declare restricted use areas and to limit pumping by
sources withdrawing over 100,000 gallons per day.' 30

2I

See KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 151.140 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980). See generally Ausness,

Water Rights Legislation in the East: A ProgramFor Reform, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV.
547 (1983); Ausness, Water Use Permits in A Riparian State: Problems and Proposals,
66 Ky. L.J. 191 (1977-78).
2 See IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 455B.268-.269 (West Supp. 1984-85).
"1 See IND. CODE ANN.
§ 13-2-2-5 (Burns 1981).
'11 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:IA-15 (West 1982).
"I See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-5-95 to 12-5-422 (1982).
' See VA. CODE §§ 62.1-44.35 to 62.1-44.44 (Michie Cum. Supp. 1984).
,27
See IND. CODE ANN. § 13-2-2.5-1 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
,-'IND. CODE ANN. § 13-2-2.5-3 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
129Emergency Order of the Indiana Department of Natural Resources, July 23,
1984.
,1IND. CODE ANN. § 13-2-2.5-2-12 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
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Minnesota has the most extensive regulation of agricultural
groundwater withdrawals in the eastern United States, but it is
too early to tell if the Minnesota scheme is a worthy model for
other Middle Western and South Eastern states. All major agricultural withdrawals in Minnesota require a state permit.' 3 ' The
state has five priorities or use preferences.' 32 Domestic use "excluding industrial and commercial uses of municipal water supply" is first 3' 3 and agricultural irrigation in excess of 10,000
gallons per day is third.'3 There are two classes of groundwater
permits.' 3 5 Class A permits are for areas of the state where
adequate groundwater data exists and Class B permits are for
all other areas.' 3 6 Nonetheless, extensive geological and hydrologic information, including a pumping test, must accompany a
Class B permit application.' 37 The statute speaks of irrigation
appropriations, but the term does not refer precisely to the
classic doctrine of prior appropriation in force in the western
states for surface waters.' 3 The statute requires all well owners
to construct wells in accordance with a state code. Once this is
done the statute protects these well owners from interference
from subsequent pumpers:
The commissioner shall issue permits for irrigation appropriation from groundwater only where he determines that proposed soil and water conservation measures are adequate based
on recommendations of the soil and water conservation districts and that water supply is available for the proposed use
without reducing water levels beyond the reach of vicinity wells
constructed in accordance with the water well construction

code.

... .

39

There is, however, no attempt to allocate supplies in times of
shortage by a priority schedule. Minnesota has done what, in

"I MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.41 (West. Supp. 1985).
12 See id.
133 Id.
134 See id.
"' MINN. STAT. ANN.
136 See id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
"'

MINN. STAT. ANN.

§ 105.416 (West Supp. 1985).

§ 105.416(3).
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effect, many western states have done to allocate groundwater.14 °
The state decides how many pumpers may enter a basin but does
not attempt to allocate further supplies among the pumpers once
the basic entry decision is made.
Any legislative redefinition of groundwater rights will be
challenged as a taking of private property without due process
of law. The landowner's argument is always that the common
law rule creates a vested property right that cannot be abridged
by the legislature. Courts have not accepted this taking argument
and have sustained legislative redefinitions against taking challenges. 14 ' The issue is not difficult when compared with other
taking issues. 42 Unlike rights to surface estates and infringements
on development potential, groundwater claimants never knew
just what they had at common law until rights among pumpers
were adjudicated. For this reason groundwater claims were always inherently unstable because of the reciprocal external effects of pumping, and thus any expectations as to quantity and
fixed pumping levels were inherently speculative. Legislatures
have long had the power to redefine property rights among
common pool owners to enhance the protection of correlative
rights,143 and under most legislative redefinitions of groundwater
rights, pumpers as a class end up with more secure rights than
they had before the regulation. This special characteristic of
groundwater has been a sufficient basis for courts to conclude
44
that there has been no taking.
CONCLUSION

As groundwater use for supplemental irrigation increases,
conflicts among pumpers will occur. Courts and, to a lesser
,4o C. MEYs & A.D. T~ALOCK, WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 689-90 (2d ed. 1980).
' See, e.g., Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324, 1326-27
(Ariz. 1981); Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 595 (Kan. 1962), appeal
dismissed, 375 U.S. 7 (1963); Crookston7 Cattle Co. v. Minnesota Dep't of Natural
Resources, 300 N.W.2d 769, 774-75 (Minn. 1980).
"I See Epstein, Not Deference, But Doctrine: The Eminent Domain Clause, 1982 Sup.
CT. REV. 351.
" See, e.g., Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 75-76 (1911); Ohio
Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 211-12 (1900).
"' See Kelly, Management of Groundwater Through Mandatory Conservation, 61
DEN. L.J. 1, 21-24 (1983) (analyzes traditional taking theories, focusing on the diminution in value theory).
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extent, legislatures will be called upon to replace capture with
sharing rules. This Article has suggested that there are both
efficiency and fairness reasons which point toward such reform.
Sharing rules are the first step toward the definition of property
rights which promote groundwater conservation and the more
efficient allocation of resources. A fairness analysis suggests that
courts divide supplemental irrigation conflicts into two classes.
A suit by a prior, small well owner against a subsequent largescale pumper ought to be treated differently from suits among
high capacity pumpers. In the first case compensation (and, in
appropriate cases, injunctive relief) ought to be the presumptive
rule where the plaintiff can prove physical interference among
wells. At the present time, there is less need for judicial intervention in the second class of cases. If supplemental irrigation
conflicts approach the scale of western conflicts, there will be a
great incentive for the pumpers themselves to seek legislative
and administrative conservation regimes. 45 There are no constitutional impediments to the redefinition of property rights, but
modification of the rule of capture for conflicts among large
scale pumpers in the Middle West and South East may be
premature. If, however, substantial pumping restrictions among
large-scale supplemental irrigators are necessary to conserve a
common supply, the modest steps discussed in this Article toward the adoption of sharing rules will be important precedents
for legislative schemes which assign firmer correlative rights.

"I One commentator, for example, recommends the creation of critical area districts
with the power to mandate across the board cutbacks as the best method to conserve
supplemental irrigation supplies in impacted areas. See Trelease, A Water Management
Law for Arkansas, 6 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 369, 374-82 (1983).

